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REMARKS ON THE PROGRESS OF A JURISPRUDENCE OF SPORT
I. INTRODUCTION
 A little over twenty years ago, I wrote a couple of articles that I thought would 
outline and begin a jurisprudence of sport.1 That was probably too ambitious a goal, 
but that there should be a jurisprudence of sport that deserved scholarly attention 
seemed as obvious to me then as it does today, for sport embodies the main elements 
of a legal system. It has laws (rules), legislators (gamewrights and official bodies 
responsible for writing and amending rules that govern conduct), and enforcement 
officials (referees, umpires, and other officials charged with upholding the rules and 
handling appeals). The parallels with legal systems of political communities are 
obvious, but so are the ways in which sport is distinctive. Consequently, sport as a 
type of system of law seemed fertile ground for having its own jurisprudence—that 
is, for the theoretical study of the foundations of sport as a legal system and of the 
study of the nature of rules and norms, legal validity, and legal reasoning in sport.
 As it happened, this was unturned ground. No one had written about these issues 
and the possible parallels with jurisprudential study of law. It was a welcome 
discovery, however, that there was a f lourishing emergent scholarly discipline in 
philosophy of sport with an active scholarly society, the International Association for 
the Philosophy of Sport, and a journal where such articles could find a natural home, 
the Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, which at that time had been publishing well-
informed and thoughtful work for approximately twenty-five years.2
 Any jurisprudential theory presumes philosophical positions about the nature 
and activities of legal systems, and so my initial articles drew on philosophy of law—in 
particular, legal positivism, natural law, and Dworkinian accounts of law and legal 
interpretation.3 These perspectives could illuminate the legal and judicial aspects of sport, 
and in particular, the role of umpires and referees4 as judges or legal decision-makers.5
1. See J.S. Russell, Are Rules All an Umpire Has to Work With?, 26 J. Phil. Sport 27 (1999) [hereinafter 
Russell, Rules]; J.S. Russell, The Concept of a Call in Baseball, 24 J. Phil. Sport 24 (1997).
2. For the Journal’s body of work, see Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, Taylor & Francis, https://www.
tandfonline.com/loi/rjps20 (last visited Feb. 18, 2019).
3. Legal positivism holds that law is a type of social fact with no inherent moral content, and it is humans 
who decide whether to incorporate moral standards into it. See Stephen W. Ball, Facts, Values, and 
Interpretation in Law: Jurisprudence from Perspectives in Ethics and Philosophy of Science, 38 Am. J. Juris. 
15, 16 (1993). Natural law theory holds the contrary: that law necessarily incorporates certain moral 
standards. See id. at 18–19. Dworkinian accounts of law, named after legal philosopher Ronald M. 
Dworkin, are frequently associated with natural law theories in holding that moral standards, or 
principles, are parts of law in addition to legal rules. See id. For more on legal positivism, natural law, 
and Dworkin’s views, see Andrew Altman, Arguing About Law: An Introduction to Legal 
Philosophy (Peter Adams et al. eds., Wadsworth 2d ed. 2000).
4. The terms “umpires” and “referees” are often used interchangeably across sport, and in some cases connote 
different levels of decision-makers. For simplicity, this article will usually refer to “umpires” to capture all 
those in judicial roles in sport—that is, all officials that serve in some judicial decision-making capacity 
regarding the conduct of sporting events, including umpires, referees, and those in positions to review and 
amend their decisions.
5. I had hoped that my articles would encourage a literature, but with the notable exception of Graham 
McFee, Sport, Rules, and Values (Routledge 2004), not much was published initially, though my 
articles did have an impact on the broader sport philosophy literature. See, e.g., Nicholas Dixon, 
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 Legal scholars and lawyers can think of this essay as roughly an investigation into 
the officiating of matters of law and fact within sport. Part II of this essay focuses on 
the relationship between rules and principles in sport, including a review of criticisms 
of positions that I advanced two decades ago. Part III discusses how these rules and 
principles inform umpire discretion in making calls, and the role that human error 
and technological review of judgment calls have on sport as a whole. Finally, Part IV 
concludes this essay with a review of the evolution of philosophy of sport and how 
these concepts can and should be used to inform a jurisprudence of sport.6
II. ARE RULES ALL AN UMPIRE HAS TO WORK WITH?
 My paper by the same name of this section7 has been used to inform perhaps the 
leading position today about the nature of sport, which goes by the name “broad 
internalism,” or sometimes “interpretivism.”8 Broad internalism holds that normative 
principles (ethical standards or norms) are embedded within and form constitutive 
Canadian Figure Skaters, French Judges, and Realism in Sport, 30 J. Phil. Sport 103 (2003); William J. 
Morgan, The Normativity of Sport: A Historicist Take on Broad Internalism, 43 J. Phil. Sport 27 (2016); 
Robert L. Simon, Internalism and Sport, in The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Sport 
22, 22–34 (Mike McNamee & William J. Morgan eds., 2015); Robert L. Simon, Internalism and 
Internal Values in Sport, 27 J. Phil. Sport 1 (2000). Things have changed dramatically—the last several 
years have seen rich interest in jurisprudential issues in sport, often partly motivated by these earlier 
articles. Here is a partial list of contributions in addition to those already cited: Harry Collins, 
Robert Evans & Christopher Higgins, Bad Call: Technology’s Attack on Referees and 
Umpires and How to Fix It (2016); Robert L. Simon, Cesar R. Torres & Peter F. Hager, Fair 
Play: The Ethics of Sport (Westview Press 4th ed. 2015); Mitchell N. Berman, “Let ‘em Play”: A 
Study in the Jurisprudence of Sport, 99 Geo. L.J. 1325 (2011) [hereinafter Berman, “Let ‘em Play”]; 
Mitchell N. Berman, On Interpretivism and Formalism in Sports Officiating: From General to Particular 
Jurisprudence, 38 J. Phil. Sport 177 (2011) [hereinafter Berman, On Interpretivism]; Mitchell N. 
Berman, Replay, 99 Cal. L. Rev. 1683 (2011); S. Seth Bordner, Call ‘em as They Are: What’s Wrong with 
Blown Calls and What to Do About Them, 42 J. Phil. Sport 101 (2015); Harry Collins, The Philosophy of 
Umpiring and the Introduction of Decision-Aid Technology, 37 J. Phil. Sport 135 (2010); Mark Hamilton, 
The Moral Ambiguity of the Makeup Call, 38 J. Phil. Sport 212 (2011); Patrick Lenta & Simon Beck, A 
Sporting Dilemma and Its Jurisprudence, 33 J. Phil. Sport 125 (2006); Stephen Mumford, Truth Makers 
for Judgement Calls, 6 Eur. J. Sport Sci. 179 (2006); Graham McFee, Officiating in Aesthetic Sports, 40 
J. Phil. Sport 1 (2013); Graham McFee, Fairness, Epistemology, and Rules: A Prolegomenon to a 
Philosophy of Officiating?, 38 J. Phil. Sport 229 (2011); Tamba Nlandu, The Fallacies of the Assumptions 
Behind the Arguments for Goal-Line Technology in Soccer, 6 Sport Ethics & Phil. 451 (2012); Richard 
Royce, Refereeing and Technology—Reflections on Collins’ Proposals, 39 J. Phil. Sport 53 (2012); Steven 
Weimer, Consent and Right Action in Sport, 39 J. Phil. Sport 11 (2012).
6. An area of jurisprudence in sport I will not address, in part because it has no direct parallel in the legal 
systems of political communities (at least not that is obvious to me), is the role of judging in what might 
be called “aesthetic” or “performance” sports. These are sports where the role of officials (usually called 
“ judges”) is to measure how well athletic performances realize certain standards of physical and aesthetic 
excellence (gymnastics, figure skating, and diving for example). However, any complete theory of 
jurisprudence in sport must give an account of judging aesthetic or performance sports.
7. Russell, Rules, supra note 1.
8. See Simon, Internalism and Internal Values in Sport, supra note 5, at 2; Simon, Internalism and Sport, supra 
note 5, at 22.
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elements of a conception of sport and of individual sports themselves.9 This realist 
theory holds that sport has a reasonably fixed constitution of normative principles 
that are broadly consistent with basic human values.10 These principles are reflected 
in the rules and practices of specific sports.11
 My early work on the role of principles within sport did not mention directly any 
commitment to realism; I was more concerned with disputing what I called “the 
ideology of games,” which I claimed was the view that, as well-known baseball 
umpire Joe Brinkman once put it, “[R]ules are rules. Rules are all an umpire has to 
work with.”12 This position—that rules are fully authoritative and thus the only 
source of normative authority for informing umpires’ decision-making—is a prevalent 
view in public discourse, shared by judges and baseball umpires alike.13 The 
limitations of this view, as well as the role of normative principles and umpire 
discretion, can be illustrated by a variety of notable moments in baseball history. 
 A. Rules, Principles, and Judicial Discretion in Sport
 In 1887, in an American Association baseball game between Louisville and 
Brooklyn, Louisville baserunner Reddy Mack safely scored after a ball was hit into 
play.14 After crossing home plate, Mack turned around and jostled the Brooklyn 
catcher to prevent a tag on the following baserunner.15 At the time, the rules in 
baseball prohibited baserunners from interfering with fielders in their handling and 
throwing of baseballs, but Mack—after crossing home plate—was no longer a 
9. Simon, Internalism and Internal Values in Sport, supra note 5, at 7.
10. See id. 
11. The realist part of this theory has had conventionalist (anti-realist) critics, but even those critics agree 
that broad internalism was correct to identify normative principles as constitutive parts of sport and 
particular sports. See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 5.
12. Russell, Rules, supra note 1, at 27, 30; see also Joe Brinkman & Charles Euchner, The Umpire’s 
Handbook 6 (The Stephen Green Press rev. ed. 1987). Brinkman spent thirty-five seasons as an 
umpire for Major League Baseball, during which time he owned and operated an umpiring school. 
Kevin Hennessy, Joe Brinkman, Soc’y Am. Baseball Res., https://sabr.org/bioproj/person/62a6e3cc 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2019). 
13. A parallel to the ideology of games is apparently held by some judges about the limitations of their 
judicial role. In his opening remarks at his United States Supreme Court confirmation hearing, Chief 
Justice John G. Roberts likened his view of judicial authority to that of baseball umpires: “Umpires don’t 
make the rules, they apply them . . . it is a limited role.” John Roberts Opening Statement, C-SPAN (Sept. 
12, 2005), https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4284078/john-roberts-opening-statement. When I teach 
philosophy of law and law classes, I like to point out that proper appreciation of what umpires do in 
sport, including how they exercise discretion from time to time to make and amend rules, shows that 
sport is not the model for judicial restraint that Chief Justice Roberts assumed. I should add that this 
ideology was also held by some law professors, in particular my colleague at the University of British 
Columbia, Stephen Wexler—a lively and very helpful informal coffee- and lunch-time adversary who 
happened to have attended and graduated from Brinkman’s umpiring school.
14. David Nemec, The Rules of Baseball: An Anecdotal Look at the Rules of Baseball and 
How They Came to Be 174 (1994); see also Russell, Rules, supra note 1, at 28. 
15. Nemec, supra note 14.
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baserunner, and so there was no rule explicitly regulating his conduct.16 In a virtuoso 
performance worthy of a great Supreme Court justice, umpire Wesley Curry ruled 
the first baserunner following Mack “out” and ordered the second baserunner 
immediately following him back on base.17
 Curry’s on-the-spot decision was not supported by any specific rule.18 However, 
his reasoning appeared irreproachable: Mack had prevented the catcher from making 
the tag on the first baserunner immediately following him, and so that runner was 
called out, rendering the ball dead. The next runner, therefore, could not be out, but 
was restored to the base he was on when the play was interrupted.19 Curry’s decision, 
in effect creating a rule governing the conduct of non-baserunners, was controversial, 
but any decision that permitted Mack’s behavior would have encouraged others to 
imitate him, threatening to turn the game of baseball into a nine-inning wrestling 
match. The rules were later changed in line with Curry’s decision.20 There should be 
a statue of Wes Curry in any pantheon of great judges.
 The strike zone in baseball is another area rife with umpire discretion. 
Throughout the history of the game, strikes have rarely, if ever, been called according 
to how the rules define them.21 Generally, umpires give extra room for strikes off the 
outside of the plate and no extra room on the inside.22 Strike zones are also adjusted 
based on the count on the batter.23 In addition, the vertical dimensions of the strike 
zone have shown themselves to be typically smaller than defined in the rules.24 Major 
League Baseball umpire Jim Evans defended the discrepancy between the rules 
defining the strike zone and the way umpires call it by saying that the strike zone 
“has evolved according to what the game demands.”25 His remarks make clear that 
sometimes the rules are at odds with what a sport requires, and umpires sometimes 
give priority to what a sport demands.
16. Id.
17. See Russell, Rules, supra note 1, at 28.
18. Nemec, supra note 14.
19. See Russell, Rules, supra note 1, at 28.
20. Id.
21. Cork Gaines, What an MLB Strike Zone Really Looks Like and Why Players Are Always So Mad About It, 
Bus. Insider (Sept. 17, 2014), https://www.businessinsider.com/mlb-strike-zone-2014-9.
22. Michael Lopez & Sadie Lewis, An Exploration of Umpires’ Strike Zones, Hardball Times (May 4, 2018), 
https://www.fangraphs.com/tht/an-exploration-of-mlb-umpires-strike-zones; see also Calling Balls & 
Strikes, Umpire Bible, http://www.umpirebible.com/index.php/rules-pitching/calling-balls-strikes (last 
visited Sept. 25, 2018). When I was receiving umpire training, I was told these amendments to the strike 
zone are justified because balls just off the outside of the plate are hittable and those just off the inside of 
the plate are not, and are dangerous to boot. We were also told that strike zones need to be adjusted based 
on the playing ability found in a league. Leagues with better pitching will see smaller strike zones.
23. John Walsh, The Compassionate Umpire, Hardball Times (Apr. 7, 2010), https://www.fangraphs.com/
tht/the-compassionate-umpire.
24. Gaines, supra note 21.
25. Russell, Rules, supra note 1, at 40. 
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 Of course there is also the famous Pine Tar Incident, when Kansas City Royals 
hall-of-famer George Brett had a potentially game-winning, top-of-the-ninth, two-
out, come-from-behind home run against the New York Yankees disallowed because 
he had pine tar on more than the bottom eighteen inches of his bat, which was 
specifically prohibited by the rules.26 The Yankees waited until after Brett’s home 
run to bring the bat to the umpires’ attention and, by stitching League rules together, 
claimed that the home run was hit with an illegally batted ball and should be 
disallowed, making Brett out and ending the game.27 
 The crew chief for the game happened to be Joe Brinkman, who argued that “[i]t 
didn’t seem right to take away Brett’s homer because of a little pine tar, but rules are 
rules. Rules are all an umpire has to work with.”28 The American League President 
Lee MacPhail disagreed, accepted the Royals’ protest of the game, and overturned 
the decision of Brinkman’s crew, arguing that their decision inappropriately put the 
letter of the rules over the spirit of the game.29 The home run was reinstated, the rest 
of the game was played later in the season, and the Royals won on the basis of Brett’s 
homer.30
 Baseball is hardly unique in having umpires exercise discretion with respect to 
rules, sometimes ignoring the letter of the rules in favor of the spirit or integrity of a 
sport. In hockey, for example, umpires are more lenient toward the end of a game, 
letting penalties go that would have been called earlier—particularly letting more go 
in the playoffs.31 A similar phenomenon can be seen in American football: Umpires 
26. “Th[e] rule—now cited as Rule 3.02(c) in the 2018 Rulebook—states: ‘The bat handle, for not more 
than 18 inches from its end, may be covered or treated with any material or substance to improve the 
grip.’” Eric Chesterton, The Pine Tar Incident, MLB (July 24, 2018), https://www.mlb.com/cut4/what-
is-the-pine-tar-game/c-286938216; see also Nemec, supra note 14, at 11–14; Russell, Rules, supra note 1, 
at 30–31. League rules allow for the use of pine tar to improve a batter’s grip, but pine tar beyond 
eighteen inches confers no advantage to the batter. See Brinkman & Euchner, supra note 12, at 5.
27. Nemec, supra note 14, at 12.
28. Brinkman & Euchner, supra note 12, at 5–6; see also Russell, Rules, supra note 1, at 30.
29. George Vecsey, The Spirit of the Rules, N.Y. Times (Aug. 1, 1983), https://www.nytimes.com/1983/08/01/
sports/the-spirit-of-the-rules.html; see also Nemec, supra note 14, at 13. 
30. Russell, Rules, supra note 1, at 30. Major League umpires were divided over whether Brinkman’s crew 
made the right decision. Ron Luciano & David Fisher, Strike Two 214 (1984). Some thought that 
the rules only required the removal of the bat from the game with no penalty, which was ultimately 
MacPhails’s decision and how the rules were clarified. Id.; Nemec, supra note 14, at 14.
31. Ingrid Rolland & Michael Lopez, Linking Penalties and Game Minute in the NHL, Hockey Graphs 
(May 28, 2018), https://hockey-graphs.com/2018/05/28/linking-penalties-and-game-minute-in-the-
nhl (observing that referees call fewer high-stakes penalties in the third period of a hockey game, 
particularly in the last few minutes). This is not the same thing as calling fewer penalties in absolute 
numbers, because players may try to get away with more in the postseason. If there is greater lenience in 
the postseason, this is probably another application of Berman’s position. Berman, “Let ‘em Play”, supra 
note 5, at 1334–36 (arguing that since more is at stake near the end of games, referees may adopt a more 
lenient approach to calling penalties); see also Mitchell N. Berman, Why Sport Illuminates Law (and Vice 
Versa), 63 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 235, 245–46 (2018–2019).
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tend to be more lenient earlier in the game,32 and it is often said that a penalty for 
holding “could be called on every play.”33 What are umpires doing in these 
circumstances? Can there be a justification for revising, adding, or ignoring rules? 
What are we to make of this evidence of umpire discretion?
 These cases and practices suggest that umpires are guided consistently by certain 
principles that are part of the sport in addition to the rules. The evidence suggests that 
the prime principle that guides them is to maintain and foster a context for displaying 
the excellences that sport is designed to test. I call this the internal principle: Rules 
should be interpreted in such a manner that the excellences embodied in achieving the 
lusory goal of the game are not undermined but are maintained and fostered.34
 I argue, drawing on Ronald Dworkin’s theory of law and judicial discretion, that 
this internal principle and derived ones, such as competitive balance, fair play, 
sportspersonship, and good conduct of games, are normative principles that are 
constitutive elements of sport as a legal system in addition to the constitutive rules of 
a sport.35 These principles constrain the discretion of judicial officials who must make 
decisions that are consistent with an understanding of what the principles require. 
This requires judgment over how much weight to give principles in any decision.
 For example, Wes Curry apparently made a judgment that Reddy Mack’s 
interference with the catcher was inconsistent with the purposes of baseball and the 
excellences it is meant to test, justifying a decision to call a runner out and the play 
dead even though there was no rule requiring it. Curry’s decision seemed to accept 
that something like the internal principle described above carried enough weight to 
justify his decision. Rules, by contrast, apply in an on-and-off fashion, depending on 
whether the facts fall or do not fall within their ambit.36
 Dworkin often described legal interpretation as a “chain novel,” where a separate 
author for each chapter attempts to develop the story in the best way possible in light 
of what other authors have done in previous chapters.37 When principles and rules 
conf lict, discretion should be exercised using a Dworkinian notion of integrity: 
Judges are to interpret the law to make it as coherent as possible, showing legal rules, 
32. Andrew Beaton, Referees Call Fewer Penalties at Beginning, End of Games, Wall St. J. (Sept. 29, 2015), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/referees-call-fewer-penalties-at-beginning-end-of-games-1443556417. 
This practice seems to apply particularly to penalties that involve a clear discretionary element—for 
example, penalties involving holding or interference. See Berman, “Let ‘em Play”, supra note 5, at 1335–36.
33. Ty Schalter, The NFL Holding Crisis: Where Do Refs Have a Responsibility to Throw Flags?, Bleacher 
Rep. (Dec. 6, 2012), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/1435107-the-nfl-holding-crisis-where-do-refs-
have-a-responsibility-to-throw-flags.
34. J.S. Russell, Moral Realism in Sport, 31 J. Phil. Sport 142, 146 (2004); see also Russell, Rules, supra note 
1, at 35 (describing this principle initially as “the first principle of games adjudication”).
35. Drawing from Dworkin, I argue that moral and perfectionist principles are parts of the legal system of 
sports and games. Dworkin agrees. See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 102–05 
(Bloomsbury Acad. 2013) (1977) (discussing the Tal-Fisher chess controversy).
36. See id. at 29–64.
37. See Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 228–32 (1986).
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principles, and decisions in their best light.38 Principles can of course be codified, but 
this does not change their logical character. And rules can—and indeed should—
reflect the underlying principles of an institution. A Dworkinian approach to judicial 
decision-making in sport would follow a principle of integrity to interpret and apply 
principles and rules found in sport to guide conduct in light of the history of a sport’s 
practice, attempting to show it in its best light.39
 B. Criticisms: Legal Positivism, Rulism, and Rules Lawyering
 This generally accepted Dworkinian reading of sport as a legal system was 
criticized as too activist, giving umpires too much discretion to amend rules.40 This 
criticism favors the virtues of legal positivism’s purported greater respect for 
eff iciency, predictability, and separation of powers between umpires and 
gamewrights—that is, judges and legislators—over a Dworkinian approach to 
adjudication in sport.41 This criticism is understandable, but the history of sport 
suggests that umpires tend to exercise principled discretion in a restrained way.
 Dworkin’s own theory acknowledges respect for legislative authority and stare 
decisis,42 so it is not clear to what extent Dworkin’s theory mandates an unduly 
activist approach to judicial decision-making. Morever, critics acknowledge that the 
judicial virtues attributed to legal positivism are not always overriding, and that a 
legal positivist and a Dworkinian approach could agree on how to deal with difficult 
cases.43 Where the Dworkinian approach is superior is its recognition of the role of 
both moral principles and normative perfectionist principles—the pursuit of athletic 
excellence—as inherent features of sports as legal systems.44 By contrast, legal 
positivism rejects the claim that legal institutions have any inherent substantive 
principled normative content.45
 Another view acknowledges that sport has internal normative principles, but 
argues that literal black-letter reading of the rules may nonetheless be consistent with 
Dworkinian interpretivism in sport.46 This view goes beyond the idea of respecting 
38. See id. at 176–275.
39. To be clear, I do not claim that a Dworkinian approach should be used when interpreting the laws of 
political communities. My point is that Dworkin’s analysis seems particularly evident in sporting 
contexts where umpires exercise discretion regarding rules.
40. Lenta & Beck, supra note 5, at 132–37. See my response in J.S. Russell, Limitations of the Sport-Law 
Comparison, 38 J. Phil. Sport 254, 266–68 (2011).
41. Lenta & Beck, supra note 5, at 132–37; Russell, supra note 40, at 266.
42. Dworkin, supra note 37, at 401.
43. See Lenta & Beck, supra note 5, at 137–38.
44. Russell, supra note 40; John S. Russell, Sport as a Legal System, in Routledge Handbook of the 
Philosophy of Sport 255, 266–67 (Mike McNamee & William J. Morgan eds., 2015).
45. See Ball, supra note 3.
46. See Berman, On Interpretivism, supra note 5, at 177–78; see also Russell, Sport as a Legal System, supra note 
44, at 267–69 (discussing Berman’s critique at length). 
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the legislative authority of gamewrights—which is itself a principle that is consistent 
with a Dworkinian analysis—and claims that from a practical perspective, umpires 
may often do a better job enforcing rules if they take a formalist approach, called 
“rulism.”47 This view does not rule out a role for the exercise of principled discretion 
from time to time—it merely acknowledges that “some degree of formalism in sports 
officiating may often be supported.”48
 This position also argues that rulism is itself a principle that is an aspect of at 
least some sports and games.49 The theory is that in some instances, “rules 
lawyering”—or the practice of using rulism to creatively stitch rules together in 
unforeseen ways—has a prominent place.50 Baseball is claimed to be such a sport that 
incorporates this feature, and the Pine Tar Incident and other examples from baseball 
are presented as evidence.51 However, instances like the Pine Tar Incident involve 
decisions that ultimately uphold the spirit or integrity of the sport—namely, that the 
rule against extra pine tar serves practical rather than competitive ends, and that a 
display of athletic excellence, therefore, should not be nullified on that basis. The 
decision to ultimately overturn the umpire’s call and allow the home run clearly 
favored an interpretivist approach over rulism or rules lawyering.
 The evidence from these examples suggests that rulism is not a serious 
consideration in baseball. Furthermore, it appears that the role of principles within 
the sport of baseball severely limits the rules lawyer’s gambits or gamesmanship. 
American League President MacPhail did not reward the Yankees for cleverness; he 
considered the precedent for the sport as an institution that would be set by accepting 
such stratagems, stating that the umpire’s decision was not in keeping with “the 
intent or spirit” of the game and that “games should be won and lost on the playing 
field—not through technicalities of the rules.”52 A similar idea had to be going 
through Curry’s mind in the Reddy Mack case and the umpires who disagreed with 
the decision of Brinkman’s crew to disallow Brett’s home run. Perhaps there will be 
some cases that go beyond mere cleverness and enrich the practice or institution of 
baseball. These will deserve more serious consideration.
 Both views—interpretivism and rulism—agree that discretion by umpires is 
something that should be exercised with restraint; the disagreement in practice may 
only be one of degree. My view is that sports sometimes demand the exercise of 
47. See Berman, On Interpretivism, supra note 5, at 178.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 185–86.
50. Id. at 186–87.
51. Id. at 183, 187–88. 
52. Russell, Rules, supra note 1, at 30; see also Russell, The Concept of a Call in Baseball, supra note 1, at 34. To 
be fair, the argument for rulism does not purport to side with the umpire’s decision in the Pine Tar 
Incident. Rather, it points out that if rulism is a principle of baseball, the umpire’s decision is more 
difficult than my discussion acknowledges. Berman, On Interpretivism, supra note 5, at 182. My response 
is that the decisions of the umpires and League officials in the hard cases from baseball stand strongly 
against acknowledging rulism and rules lawyering. I do not see evidence for it in other sports either.
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discretion in ways that cannot be reasonably avoided, or discretion is justified because 
it makes for a better sport. These exercises of umpire discretion are not typically 
controversial—discretion with respect to late game penalties or the strike zone in 
baseball is accepted as part of the game. However, sometimes genuine puzzles are 
raised that the rules do not account for, as with the Pine Tar Incident or the Reddy 
Mack case, so that whatever is decided is going to be controversial. A principled 
solution that tries to make sense of a sport in light of its practice should be preferred 
because it represents a sincere effort to preserve the integrity of the contest. Since an 
action must be taken, and since any decision is unlikely to please everyone, an impartial, 
principled attempt to make the right decision may also be the best way to defend the 
legitimacy of and trust in the umpire’s authority. All this is consistent with amending 
the rules, where possible, to reflect discretion that has been exercised wisely.
 C. Subversive Play, Competitive Shenanigans, and Value Pluralism in Sport
 There is a deeper point implied in the rules lawyering argument that has made 
me think more carefully about the normative principles that underlie sport. The 
suggestion is that intellectual cleverness in finding ways to get around what the 
practice of sport seems to require is itself a type of sport skill.53 Identifying this 
principle helps to explain further some of the normative complexity umpires face in 
weighing principles. More importantly, it illustrates quite nicely a depth of competing 
values, or value pluralism, in sport that the internal principle might seem to discount. 
But while this additional principle requires us to recognize added complexity, it also 
helps to explain that the internal principle retains a dominant role. That principle is 
a principle of play.
 A common feature of play is that it takes liberties with accepted values and 
conventions.54 While much of the philosophical discussion of play has centered on its 
connection to intrinsically valued activities that reflect unalienated exercise of agency, 
this discussion has overlooked play’s disengagement from serious aspects of moral and 
perfectionist values of everyday life and within sport. Play is often subversive of 
worldly standards and practices, like morality and perfection, and is ref lected in 
morally ambiguous and often questionable behavior that is tolerated because of its 
disengagement from everyday life and the delight it gives.55
 Think of children playing cops and robbers, gleefully committing imagined 
murder or mayhem. This behavior would not be tolerated outside a realm of play. 
Indeed, it would be cause for moral condemnation and, often, legal action. But 
because play can be disengaged from the worldly, such activity is often tolerated 
53. See Berman, On Interpretivism, supra note 5, at 187.
54. See Brian Sutton-Smith, The Ambiguity of Play (Harv. Univ. Press 1997); see also J.S. Russell, 
Play and the Moral Limits of Sport, in Ethics in Sport 205, 208–22 (William J. Morgan ed., 3d ed. 
2018).
55. I argue that this is also the position on play in the classic conceptual analysis given by Johan Huizinga, 
Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture 13 (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1949).
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because of the delight it brings to our lives.56 Similarly, when it comes to sport, play 
reflects a measure of moral and emotional disengagement.
 The gratuitousness of sport and its practical separation from the worldly makes 
sport a natural and fertile playground. Partisan fan behavior, intentional attempts to 
deceive umpires (for example, baseball pitchers making illegal “balk moves” to hold 
runners, or catchers “framing” pitches), and strategic fouling are all types of 
“competitive shenanigans” that are in conf lict to some degree with moral or 
perfectionist values found within sport.57 Some types of gamesmanship involve clever 
barbs to throw opponents off their game. Recall the Chicago Bulls’ Scottie Pippen’s 
remark to Karl “The Mailman” Malone of the Utah Jazz, when the latter was about 
to take free throws that would likely seal a Jazz win in the Sunday Game 1 of the 
1997 NBA Finals.58 Pippen said, “Just remember, the mailman does not deliver on 
Sundays, Karl.”59 Malone missed both free throws; the Bulls recovered the ball and 
sank a shot at the buzzer to win.60
 Remarks like Pippen’s and other competitive shenanigans are found in sport in 
part because of sport’s (and play’s) disengagement from the worldly. We tolerate these 
activities, and often celebrate them. Of course, the behavior described above has its 
limits. But where competitive shenanigans add to the challenge, drama, and fun of 
sport, they can be incorporated because they make sport better.
 Drawing the boundary where competitive shenanigans improve or at least do not 
detract from a contest is a complex matter, and it may be thought that this adds to 
the argument for tending toward formalism. Perhaps this is true. The principle of 
play implies added complexity in weighing values, and so apparently adds burdens to 
real-time decision-making of umpires, which could be eased by strict adherence to 
black-letter rules. But umpires are also expected to exercise discretion where this 
value is engaged. When does playful verbal repartee like Pippen’s cross a boundary 
and interfere with the good conduct of games? Umpires are expected to police these 
matters and, in many sports, penalize players for unsporting behavior.
 Perhaps rules lawyering in sport is best thought of as a form of competitive 
shenanigans. Rules lawyering takes a disengaged attitude toward the institution of a 
sport in a gambit to see what can, and cannot, be done to gain a competitive 
advantage. If the baseball examples are any indication, rules lawyering efforts may 
strike too closely at the core of the game to be accepted. But while play as 
disengagement and related competitive shenanigans are not dominant values in 
56. Philosopher John Morreall argues that in the case of humor, play gets a pass because it is non-
cognitive—the humorous gibes are not meant to be true or to be taken seriously—and because it is 
practically disengaged from everyday life. John Morreall, Comic Relief: A Comprehensive 
Philosophy of Humor xii (2009).
57. See Russell, supra note 54, at 213–14.
58. Aaron Dodson, On This Day in NBA Finals History: ‘The Mailman Doesn’t Deliver on Sunday,’ The 
Undefeated (June 1, 2017), http://theundefeated.com/features/nba-history-scottie-pippen-karl-
malone-1997-finals.
59. See id.
60. Id.
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sport, they have a place to the extent that they add to the challenge and drama of 
those institutions, or at least do not significantly detract from them. Further, they 
press us to consider and weigh competing values in developing, evaluating, and 
revising rules. They suggest an important value pluralism is present in sport between 
the moral, athletic, and play values. The presence of these and other potentially 
competing values—including those that are focused on the development of sport-
related excellence, such as resilience, grit, patience, perseverance, and coping61— 
suggests more complexity in working out a jurisprudence of sport than I suggested in 
my original article.
III. MAKING THE CALLS
 A. The Concept of a Call
 When hall-of-famer Bill Klem, arguably the doyen of baseball umpires, remained 
silent momentarily after a pitch, the batter pressed him, “What is it? A ball or a 
strike?” Klem responded, “Sonny, it ain’t nothin’ ‘til I call it.”62 Another baseball hall-
of-fame umpire, Bill McGowan, made a similar point to a player protesting his call: 
“If you don’t believe you’re out, read the morning newspaper!”63 Their point? Umpires 
create facts by their calls.
 In sport, umpires often have the role of determining by their pronouncements the 
events on the field by calling ball, strike, safe, out, fair, or foul. However, it is a 
property of facts that they do not have the status of being true or false—facts exist as 
pieces of information that have objective reality. It is a property of descriptions of facts 
that those descriptions are true or false. We cannot let this rest, then, with Klem’s 
and McGowan’s comments. If we treat calls simply as facts, and not also as statements 
that can be true or false, the idea of “getting the call right” would be meaningless, 
which it is not.
 The philosopher of language J.L. Austin proposed a solution to the puzzle 
presented by Klem and McGowan. Austin noted that the “performative” parts of 
language (language we use when doing things like making promises, laws, or 
marriages; or calling balls, strikes, or outs) are often combined in the same utterance 
with descriptive or declarative statements which are true or false.64 Austin called 
judicial pronouncements “verdictives” as one illustration of this combination, since 
61. See J.S. Russell, Robert L. Simon on Sport, Values, and Education, 43 J. Phil. Sport 51, 53 (2016). Other 
possible normative perspectives in sport have been identified as 1) achieving excellence; 2) seeking 
opportunities for new experiences or serendipity; 3) discovering things about onself and what one can 
do; 4) participating in dramatic narrative; 5) transcending limits; and 6) creating community through 
cooperation and shared achievement. Scott Kretchmar, Pluralistic Internalism, 42 J. Phil. Sport 83 
(2015). These ideas have clear connections to moral, athletic (perfectionist), and play values.
62. George Sullivan & Barbara Lagowski, The Sports Curmudgeon 164 (1993).
63. Id. at 165.
64. J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words: The William James Lectures Delivered at 
Harvard University in 1955 148–52 (J.O. Urmson & Marina Sbisà eds., 2d ed. 1975).
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judicial decisions create facts (the verdict) and can be true or false.65 Thus, the verdict 
in a criminal trial (say, “not guilty”) is a fact, but it also expresses a statement that is 
true or false (the accused may have been guilty despite the verdict).
 Verdictive utterances are also commonly accompanied with “exercitive force,” or 
the authority to do things like remove runners from baseball games.66 Consider the 
duality of the umpire’s statement: “You are out.” Or simply, “Out.” The latter 
expression emphasizes the exercitive force, making the runner out, but the former 
phrasing shows itself as more clearly a statement of fact based on evidence, meaning, 
“The first baseman caught the ball before your foot touched first base.” Thus, 
verdictives are pieces of language that combine the creation of facts with statements 
that are true or false, and so explain the limitations of Klem’s and McGowan’s claims 
about calls.67 This position justifies umpire discretion to consult with other umpires 
and officials to review cases of unwitnessed calls, egregious errors, guesses, and 
failures of impartiality in an effort to find the correct decision.68 Since these are only 
calls in a technical, equivocal sense, umpires function equivocally (at best) as judges. 
In such cases, help should be sought or given, as these calls can be legitimately subject 
to review in consultation with other umpires in an effort to find the correct decision. 
 My argument on this topic was published at a time when video reviews of calls in 
sport were just being introduced.69 As a consequence, I did not address in any detail 
the question of the extent to which video review should be used. I suggested only 
that more discussion was needed and that there was a good argument for its use on 
crucial plays.70 Since that time, video review has been used quite extensively in Major 
League Baseball and other sports.71 I have a few critical comments about this, but I 
would like to begin by addressing a recent objection to my earlier analysis. This will 
lead to a more nuanced discussion about calls and the use of video replay and other 
technology to assist umpires in making calls.
 B. Criticism: Calls Can’t Be Wrong!
 Jim Joyce, veteran MLB umpire, admitted immediately after a game that he had 
“cost [then Detroit Tigers pitcher Armando Galarraga] a perfect game” when he 
65. Id. at 151. 
66. See id. at 155.
67. I noted another feature about making calls in sport is that umpires are also witnesses to the events that 
they observe, and of course, a call as a witness’s report can be either true or false. Russell, The Concept of 
a Call in Baseball, supra note 1, at 23–24.
68. Id. at 24–27. 
69. See Howard Beck et al., Let’s Go to the Tape: How Other Sports Handle Video Review, N.Y. Times (Aug. 
15, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/16/sports/lets-go-to-the-tape-how-other-sports-handle-
video-review.html (providing the years in which various professional sports began utilizing video 
technology for reviewing plays).
70. Russell, The Concept of a Call in Baseball, supra note 1, at 36–37 n.20. 
71. See Beck et al., supra note 69.
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called a runner safe at first when he clearly should have been out.72 In a post-game 
interview, Joyce did not make the excuse that it was a close call. Instead, he apologized 
for his mistake, claiming that he blew “the biggest call of [his] career.”73 “This is a 
history call, and I kicked the shit out of it.”74
 One analysis of calls argues that umpires like Jim Joyce cannot be wrong.75 The 
argument re-characterizes the issue as a version of the famous dilemma from Plato’s 
dialogue Euthyphro—whether something is morally obligatory because God 
commands it (the first horn), or whether God commands something because it is 
morally obligatory (the second horn).76 In philosophy of religion, “voluntarism” takes 
the former position (God’s pronouncements by themselves make or constitute 
morality), and “intellectualism” takes the latter (God’s pronouncements reliably 
identify what morality is).77 The argument suggests the following parallel and 
dilemma arise with an umpire’s judgment call: “Is a pitch a ball/strike, a batted ball 
fair/foul, a runner safe/out because the umpire calls it as such, or is a pitch a ball/
strike, a batted ball fair/foul, a runner safe/out independently of the umpire’s call?”78 
 In response to this “baseball dilemma,” the argument rejects what it says is the 
strictly intellectualist position in favor of a version of the first horn of the dilemma, 
calling it “restricted umpire voluntarism.”79 The strict intellectualist, it claims, holds 
that a runner who is “out at first” has an obligation to leave the field independently 
of the umpire’s call, and since this obligation “has nothing to do with the umpire’s 
call,” the umpire is, in theory, “wholly dispensible.”80 By contrast, the voluntarist 
argues that it is the authoritativeness of the umpire’s call that makes the runner out.81 
Since an umpire’s call is not a report of an event or a witness’s observation—it is a 
fact, pure and simple, and is not true or false—the player has a duty to leave the field 
because of the umpire’s authority to make the call and the powers that go along with 
it.82 The umpire is therefore indispensable in a way that the intellectualist cannot 
72. Bradley Blackburn & Lee Ferran, MLB Will Not Reverse Ump’s Call that Cost Armando Galarraga Perfect 
Game, ABC News (June 3, 2010), https://abcnews.go.com/WN/bad-call-reviewed-major-league-
baseball-ump-admits/story?id=10815336.
73. Id.
74. Armando Galarraga, Jim Joyce & Daniel Paisner, Nobody’s Perfect: Two Men, One Call, 
and a Game for Baseball History 5 (Atlantic Monthly Press 2011). 
75. See Amber L. Griffioen, Why Jim Joyce Wasn’t Wrong: Baseball and the Euthyphro Dilemma, 42 J. Phil. 
Sport 327 (2015). 
76. See id. at 329–31; see also Plato, Five Dialogues 12–14 (G.M.A. Grube trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 2d 
ed. 2002). 
77. See Griffioen, supra note 75, at 329–31.
78. Id. at 331.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 335–36.
81. Id. at 339–40.
82. Id. at 335. Notably though, the argument adds that a call “may be responsive to certain assessments 
which are truth-evaluable.” Id.
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accept. According to this “restricted voluntarism” view, Joyce’s admission of error and 
his apology for that error is conceptually confused, because “[a]s a prescriptive 
utterance, it was incapable of being incorrect.”83
 I think this misconceives a fundamental aspect of what it is to be a judge—
namely, to do one’s best to get decisions correct based on the evidence. The very 
concept of a judge presupposes exercise of authority in line with this function, which 
is fundamentally truth-evaluable. When judges fail badly in fulfilling this function, 
they are not really performing the role of a judge or umpire. The very idea of a 
human judge or umpire, then, seems to be intellectualist, not voluntarist. Joyce’s 
personal apology to Galarraga immediately after the game is an admirable reflection 
of an intellectualist’s understanding of his role, his responsibility, and his failure to 
live up to it in a crucial situation.
 The voluntarist view allows that Joyce might apologize for a failure of judicial 
virtues, including competence and consistency.84 But that invites the question: 
Competence and consistency in relation to what? Joyce’s apology was for failing to 
live up to expected epistemic standards, thereby getting an important call wrong on 
the evidence that was available to him. An apology that does not admit that full 
account misses a crucial point about the call, namely, Joyce “missed it,” and missed it 
badly. An apology for a lack of competence, but not for any mistake made as a result 
of that incompetence because calls cannot be mistaken, seems too paradoxical to 
accept. The intellectualist view, on the other hand, encompasses the admission of 
being both wrong and having made a mistaken decision or choice.
 Further, the voluntarist position separates the verdictive from the exercitive forces 
in an umpire’s call, but I doubt this is possible. Verdicts attempt to make truth-
evaluable decisions based on evidence.85 In the case of sport, this evidence includes 
the umpire’s own observations. Those verdicts (such as “strike” or “out”) have 
exercitive force or authority when uttered by an umpire whose job is to make an 
assessment about whether certain behavior is captured by the rules they are charged 
with upholding. Put simply, the exercitive force of a call derives its authority from the 
making of a truth-evaluable assessment or verdict, because it is the function of a 
human judge to exercise authority based on a judgment or verdict regarding the 
evidence; otherwise, judicial direction is just an empty exercise of authority. These 
direct connections mean we can evaluate the quality of the decision, both the verdict 
and whether the authority should have been exercised a certain way, based on how 
well it is justified in light of the evidence.
 The voluntarist also seems to argue that players have no obligation to leave the 
field on a mistaken call in their favor.86 It is difficult to see how a voluntarist can take 
this idea seriously, or even regard it as coherent, if umpires are “incapable of being 
83. Id. at 342.
84. Id. 
85. See Austin, supra note 64, at 152.
86. Cf. Griffioen, supra note 75, at 336.
190
REMARKS ON THE PROGRESS OF A JURISPRUDENCE OF SPORT
incorrect.”87 It appears to be a virtue of the intellectualist position that a player could 
take seriously the argument that they have an obligation to correct mistaken calls.88 
It seems relevant, too, that it used to be a fairly common practice in some officiated 
games for players to correct umpire errors in their favor.89 This suggests recognition 
of some degree of duty to play the game according to the rules and not to accept 
undeserved benefits based on known officiating errors.90 Consistent with an 
intellectualist position, I have argued that cooperative practices around officiating 
should be encouraged, and umpires’ consultations with players and coaches on calls 
should form part of the evidence for decisions on contested or unwitnessed calls.91
 Finally, the trend toward video review is implicitly a trend toward acknowledging 
that the epistemic quality of the decision or verdict of the umpire bears on its 
exercitive force. Arguably, an implication of this trend toward electronic review and 
getting calls right should be to recognize a more cooperative approach among 
umpires—and among umpires and contestants—to getting calls right where 
electronic reviews are not available.
 C. Accepting Umpire Fallibility for the Good of the Game
 An alternative to the voluntarist’s view that we may be accepting of undeserved 
advantages gained by umpire errors could be supported by the notion of play as a 
relevant normative principle in sport. If play can significantly be about disengagement 
or separation from moral or perfectionist considerations, then we have evidence for 
allowing some acceptance of undeserved advantages, especially including some 
umpiring errors. This use of a principle of play does not change an understanding of 
the role of umpires to get calls right based on the evidence before them. Indeed, it 
presupposes it by suggesting that umpiring errors can be part of the fabric of sport—
part of the challenge, drama, and delight it provides.
87. Id. at 342.
88. See id. For a comparison between accepting undeserved benefits in sport and making use of undeserved 
benefits outside of sport—for example, not reporting and then spending a banking error in one’s favor—
see J.S. Russell, Coaching and Undeserved Competitive Success, in The Ethics of Coaching Sports: 
Moral, Social, and Legal Issues 103, 103–20 (Robert L. Simon ed., 2013). I cannot see how such a 
comparison can be taken seriously on Griffioen’s view.
89. An example of this is in tennis, when players intentionally hit their next volley into the net. See Ashley 
Fetters, How Instant Replay Changed Professional Tennis, Atlantic (Sept. 7, 2012), https://www.
theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2012/09/how-instant-replays-changed-professional-
tennis/262060 (“[I]f an umpire blew a call, the beneficiary of the wrongly awarded point would 
sometimes lose the following one on purpose.”) In the 2005 Rome Masters, tennis great Andy Roddick 
went so far as to refuse a mistaken match point call in his favor, allowing his opponent Fernando 
Verdasco to re-serve and eventually win the match. Giles Lucas, Ten Examples of Great Sportsmanship, 
Evening Standard (Aug. 1, 2011), https://www.standard.co.uk/sport/ten-examples-of-great-
sportsmanship-6428038.html. In 1997, Liverpool striker Robbie Fowler received a commendation from 
FIFA for informing the referee during a match that he had not been fouled and a penalty shot should 
not be awarded. Id.
90. See Simon, Torres & Hager, supra note 5, at 23.
91. Russell, supra note 88.
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 Voluntarists must say this is conceptually confused, since umpires do not make 
errors.92 Intellectualists can fully embrace this position by recognizing the value of 
play qua disengagement from morality and perfection (athletic excellence) as an 
element of a sport. We accept umpire errors because they can make some sports 
games better, even at some cost to having sports ref lect pure contests of athletic 
excellence. There is no obligation, then, to leave the field on a mistaken call because 
sports that embody a value of disengaged play provide a reason for accepting a 
mistake that is independent of the umpire’s authority.
 I am not sure how these competing normative positions should be evaluated in 
sports like baseball. Certainly, the culture and history seem to favor the play-inspired 
practice that accepts some disengagement with some perfectionist or moral values by 
accepting that bad luck through umpire errors can be part of the game. More discussion 
is needed about this and what appears to be a distinctive feature of a jurisprudence of 
sport. I do not mean to defend a specific position here, but I suspect the moral tone of 
sport would be improved if a more cooperative approach were sometimes taken to 
collecting evidence to make calls. It would also, I suspect, encourage better 
sportspersonship, and it would help to address, if not completely resolve, some of the 
morally challenging features that seem intrinsic to competitive sport.93
 D. Brief Remarks on the Use of Video and Other Technological Forms of Review
 I confess that I find the human element as well as the element of luck introduced 
by fallible human umpiring to be a part of sport that is worth cherishing. It might be 
morally messy or ambiguous to accept such fallibilism, but play as disengagement 
often supports such practices. My analysis of play and making calls affords a way of 
preserving the purported baseball purist’s position without adopting the paradoxical 
voluntarist view. We might acknowledge that a principle of disengaged play justifies 
accepting some measure of fallible umpire decision-making. This brings us to the 
topic of video review, since this appears in tension with this position.
 As I have suggested, one solution grounded in the value of play that would 
preserve the human element and improve call-making would be to encourage a more 
cooperative approach on the field between umpires and participants. However, others 
have argued that if we had electronic systems that could do better jobs than humans, 
we should adopt those systems, even if they eliminated human umpires completely.94 
I am not so sure. There would still be luck, mistakes, and probably some interesting 
moral failures—cooperating participants may still make incorrect calls and some 
participants may lie or be evasive about what they saw. Officiating would remain a 
deeply human enterprise. I suspect this sort of on-field process would be more 
enjoyable and dramatic to watch than the increasingly extensive use of video review 
that is emerging as standard practice at the most elite levels of sport, or having robot 
92. See Griffioen, supra note 75, at 342.
93. See J.S. Russell, Competitive Sport, Moral Development, and Peace, in The Bloomsbury Companion to 
the Philosophy of Sport 228, 228–44 (Cesar R. Torres ed., 2014). 
94. See Bordner, supra note 5, at 114. 
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officials run games. We might also argue that non-technological, purely human 
officiating processes would make games more challenging, dramatic, and interesting 
for everyone. Given the capacious presence of technology in our lives, we might 
choose to preserve sport as a fully human enterprise, along with its shortcomings.95
 There are a variety of other issues raised by the use of video replay and 
technological aids for identifying interactions of balls with playing areas. There is a 
substantial literature now that is emerging on these topics—in effect, a jurisprudence 
around the use of technological aids and related umpire decision-making in sport.96 
Some emphasize that some technological aids are themselves imperfect, as they have 
“zones of uncertainty” that tend to be obscured by their apparently scientific modes 
of measurement.97 One argument is that only errors identified conclusively using 
technology should overturn on-field umpires’ decisions.98 This has been the standard 
practice in sport.99 I am not sure this argument is fully persuasive—if machines or 
video review have a smaller risk of error, then arguably we should defer to them when 
there is a controversy. However, this view seems to lead us ultimately to something 
like the position that we should prefer the use of technological aids whenever they 
are demonstrably superior to human judgment.100
 There are practical issues to be addressed in addition to the philosophical ones 
already discussed that might qualify the use of such technology. The use of 
technological aids for umpiring can disrupt the f low of games to the detriment of the 
competition and spectator enjoyment.101 Athletes are expected to sit on the sideline 
or take a knee, sometimes over several minutes, waiting for a call to be reviewed; fans 
experience a delay in celebrating results once momentum on the field has dissipated. 
Not only does this delay produce boring, inactive dead time for athletes and fans 
waiting for results of review, but there is also a potential cost to competition, as f low 
and momentum are interrupted, and athletes stiffen up or fatigue sets in.
95. This is probably contrary to what we might want from a municipal judicial system. If somehow 
demonstrably better justice could be served with robot judges who were not corrupted by the vagaries of 
human cognitive biases and other limitations, I would find it difficult to reject supporting their use, 
dystopian science fiction notwithstanding. This is now a topic of public discussion. Andrew Griffin, 
Robot Judges Could Soon Be Helping Court Cases, Independent (Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.
independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/ai-judge-robot-european-court-of-human-rights-
law-verdicts-artificial-intelligence-a7377351.html (discussing a study where an artificial-intelligence 
judge accurately predicted seventy-nine percent of 584 European Court of Human Rights verdicts). 
96. See, e.g., Collins, Evans & Higgins, supra note 5; Bordner, supra note 5; Berman, Replay, supra note 5; 
Collins, supra note 5; Royce, supra note 5.
97. See Collins, Evans & Higgins, supra note 5, at 88; Collins, supra note 5, at 140–41.
98. Collins, supra note 5, at 143.
99. See Berman, Replay, supra note 5, for a thoughtful discussion about the presumption of giving on-field 
umpires the benefit of the doubt when video results are less than conclusive.
100. See Bordner, supra note 5, at 102 (“[W]e ought to use technology to aid officials in making their 
judgments whenever doing so would prove more effective than relying on unaided human pereception.”).
101. See Peter Shawn Taylor, Video Replay Is Ruining Professional Sports, Maclean’s (May 7, 2017), https://
www.macleans.ca/sports/video-replay-is-ruining-professional-sports. 
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 Another issue is that technological aids may interfere with important athletic 
challenges that umpires impose through the exercise of discretion. In sports generally, 
calls often depend on the circumstances of the game, the influence of crowds and 
“home-field advantage,” and the tendency of umpires and crews to call certain 
infractions more or less often.102 In baseball, technology now makes it possible to 
eliminate umpires calling balls and strikes—but baseball purists argue against this, 
even if it would more accurately ref lect the strike zone as defined in the rules.103 
Sports like golf, in which “[p]layers are expected to call penalties on themselves” and 
“to protect the field” by monitoring each other’s play,104 provide another instructive 
example about the potential corrupting effects of technological aids.
 These are real costs to sport that have to be weighed against the cost of getting 
calls right. It is unclear to me when the benefit of getting a call right outweighs these 
other costs. Arguably, sport tests human resilience as much or more than any other 
value, so dealing with adversity seems to be a fundamental value of sport.105 Players 
have to adapt to these circumstances. From coaching baseball for many years, my 
sense is that the need to make these adaptations adds to the interest, challenge, and 
fun of some sports. Their value should not be discounted lightly.
 The general takeaway from this discussion is that making judgment calls in many 
sports is complex, and recent changes to incorporate various types of electronic review 
of such calls are more controversial and require considerably more thought than has 
been recognized. I doubt that the homogenization that the use of technological aids 
brings necessarily makes for better, more interesting sports. A proper jurisprudence of 
sport needs to work through and come to terms with these complexities.
IV. CONCLUSION: PHILOSOPHY OF SPORT AND A JURISPRUDENCE OF SPORT
 Sport can be used to illustrate basic issues and theories in jurisprudence. The 
connection between a jurisprudence of sport and a general conception of sport and its 
102. See David Beaudoin, Oliver Schulte & Tim B. Swartz, Biased Penalty Calls in the National Hockey 
League, 9 Stat. Analysis & Data Mining 365, 367 (2016), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/
epdf/10.1002/sam.11320 (noting the variance in penalties levied against “road teams” and “home teams” 
in professional hockey); see also Thomas Dohmen & Jan Sauermann, Referee Bias, 30 J. Econ. Surv. 679 
(2015), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joes.12106. In baseball, for example, it is well 
known by players and fans that the strike zone is called differently by different umpires. Lopez & 
Lewis, supra note 22. When I received umpire training, I was told to call a strike on any pitch up to half 
a ball’s width off the plate, because pitches are hittable in most of the zone from top to bottom, and the 
pitcher deserves a strike if he can hit that spot.
103. See Oliver Staley, When Robots Call Balls and Strikes, Who Will Baseball Fans Yell At?, Quartz (July 11, 
2017), https://qz.com/1026559/all-star-game-this-will-be-one-of-the-last-all-star-games-in-baseball-
not-umpired-by-robots (“Baseball purists lament that technology will make pitch-framing obsolete—a 
robot can’t be fooled by a slight [sic] of hand—and that removing umpires will eliminate the human 
drama that produces some of baseball’s most memorable and embarrassing episodes.”). 
104. The Human Element, U.S. Golf Ass’n, https://www.usga.org/handicapping/handicapping-101/the-
human-element-25503.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2019).
105. J.S. Russell, Resilience, 42 J. Phil. Sport 159, 159 (2015). 
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animating values is direct, necessary, and predicted by a Dworkinian analysis.106 Just 
as judges of modern political communities are engaged at some level in political 
philosophy,107 umpires and officials charged with enforcing, evaluating, and writing 
rules are engaged in philosophy of sport. But this comparison also suggests some 
limitations in comparing the legal systems of political communities with sport as a 
legal system. Many of the main values that each is concerned with are, of course, 
fundamentally different, and I suspect that despite the range of competing values of 
sport as an institution, its values are considerably less contested. Some evidence of 
this is that the internal principle, as I suggested above, has a dominant role among 
these other principles and values, and can be helpful in guiding and justifying a 
range of decisions.108
 This should not be very controversial in my view, since sport begins with 
displaying, contesting, or testing excellences that have an important physical 
element.109 Also, it does not seem controversial to say that certain normative principles 
are fundamental to the fabric of sport. For all its undoubted complexity, I suspect 
that sport represents a simpler, less contested, conceptual arena for developing a 
jurisprudence, because normative principles can be identified as part of the institution, 
and are arguably accepted in deed, if not always in word.
 I got into this business, in part, by using sport in my philosophy of law classes to 
illustrate Dworkin’s ideas and contrast them with legal positivism and other theories 
of law. I am hopeful that legal scholars will pick up the ball (so to speak) and get to 
work explaining how other jurisprudential ideas from law can assist understanding 
issues in sport and philosophy of sport. I am pleased that this is beginning to happen. 
My legal scholar colleagues have been hard at work productively explaining how 
jurisprudential ideas can assist in understanding issues in philosophy of sport and 
how legal practice in sport can illuminate, often at a more accessible level, 
jurisprudential concepts and practices of political communities.110 My general sense, 
106. Russell, Rules, supra note 1, at 38–39.
107. See Dworkin, supra note 35.
108. But see Mcfee, Fairness, Epistemology, and Rules, supra note 5, at 236–42, for a thoughtful, critical 
discussion of the usefulness of this principle, and my response, Russell, Sport as a Legal System, supra 
note 44, at 269–70. McFee thinks that sports are too contextual for general principles to guide decision-
making in controversial cases. The examples discussed here suggest otherwise. 
109. See Bernard Suits, The Elements of Sport, in The Philosophy of Sport: A Collection of Essays (R. 
Ousterhoudt ed., 1973). 
110. See generally Berman, supra note 31. Robert Blecker has provided an acute, and in my view compelling, 
analysis about how notions of intent in criminal law can assist with clarifying concepts and evaluation of 
unsportsmanlike conduct (in particular, “f lagrant” fouls in basketball), among other things. See Robert 
Blecker, Penalties: Punishments, Prices, or Rewards?, 63 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 251 (2018–2019). There is 
much rich, unturned ground here. I also suspect that when the jurisprudence of a political community is 
silent on an issue, sport can be instructive. I note, for example, that “cheating” is not a legally defined 
term. I have expressed skepticism that the term can be defined in such a way as to provide meaningful 
normative guidance. See J.S. Russell, The Problem of Cheating, in Philosophy: Sports 92, 92–110 (R. 
Scott Kretchmar ed., 2017). The absence of a definition of cheating in law is some support for my view. 
Robert Blecker suggests that cheating must involve intentional deception. See What Can Law Teach Sport 
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then, is that we are in a position now to begin a rich dialogue that will allow us to 
begin to integrate a more fine-grained analysis of the values that sport encompasses 
with conceptual and other resources from modern jurisprudential theory into a more 
sophisticated and comprehensive jurisprudence of sport. 
 Much of this essay and the short history of a jurisprudence of sport has focused 
on philosophical and related normative issues about what sort of legal system sport 
is. It has tied sport qua legal system to fundamental debates in philosophy of law and 
to discussion of fundamental human values, like excellence (perfection) and play. My 
essays have drawn heavily on these resources. I would like to think that starting with 
foundational discussions in philosophy of law and about basic human values was a 
good place to begin, and that the discussion that has followed has been productive in 
illuminating the nature of sport as a legal system and processes of legal reasoning 
that take place there. I hope and expect these investigations to continue and to 
deepen our understanding of sport.
 However, there is more than this to a jurisprudence of sport. I would like to see a 
jurisprudence of sport develop further in the direction of comparative law—comparing 
sport as a legal system to the less abstract aspects of the operation of legal systems of 
political communities. This is not something that philosophically trained scholars are 
particularly competent to do. It takes jurists and lawyers, ideally with some solid 
knowledge of sport, to be able to draw relevant comparisons, because the topics at this 
level tend to be more applied and focused directly on practice than are addressed by 
general theories of law and legal reasoning. Questions of intent, blame, punishment, 
standards of proof, the conduct of judicial review, and the like are often subjects of 
comparative law, and they all have counterparts in sport. This invites comparative 
evaluation, but that ground has barely been touched. Again, my colleagues have begun 
serious work in this area, and I look forward to their work attracting the interest of 
others. This Issue of the New York Law School Law Review, which is devoted to 
questions about relationships and comparisons between law and sport, should encourage 
that interest as well. To my knowledge, it is the first law journal that has devoted an 
entire issue to jurisprudential issues raised by sport. Hopefully its publication will 
encourage further works by legal scholars in all areas encompassed by a jurisprudence 
of sport. The past twenty years have shown that there are rich opportunities for 
scholarship. I look forward to seeing the results of the next twenty years.
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